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ABSTRACT 
 
Credit Default Swaps have been a major cause of problems to financial institutions during the 
current economic downturn.  What is a CDS?  Why was it developed?  What went wrong?  This 
paper discusses these questions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he current financial crisis has been an education in complex financial instruments.  The first 
instrument that we became familiar with was the Collateralized Debt Instrument (CDO) or securities 
backed by pools of mortgages, student loans, credit card debt, corporate bonds, or other debt 
instruments.  Now the instrument we are hearing about is the Credit Default Swap (CDS).  This paper will explain 
the CDS, examine its purpose, and look at what went wrong – or the good, the bad and the ugly. 
 
THE GOOD 
 
A Credit Default Swap is not a traditional swap where two parties “swap” future cash flow streams.  It is 
insurance-type contract which promises to cover the buyer of the contract’s losses in the event of a default on the 
“insured” debt instrument.  The CDS provides the buyer with protection by paying the face value of the bond or loan 
if a borrower fails to meet its debt obligations.  On the other hand, the seller of the contract speculates that the 
company will not fail and generates a return (a stream of payments or premium) for providing the protection.  
Contracts typically are sold to protect against losses on mortgage securities, corporate bonds, and municipal bonds.  
Sellers include banks, insurance companies, hedge funds and other financial institutions. 
 
The CDS transformed debt markets over the last decade.  Investors desired higher yields, but not the 
additional risk generated by lending to less creditworthy borrowers.  By providing a hedging instrument, the CDS 
allowed investors to increase their expected return, but limit additional risk by protecting them if borrowers failed to 
make debt payments.  From the seller of the contract’s point-of-view, the CDS was considered easy money.  The 
economy was growing, corporate bankruptcies were infrequent, the housing market was booming, and consumers 
were spending.  The CDS was seen as a low risk method to generate cash.  
 
As the economy flourished, a flood of funds entered the CDS market.  To accommodate these funds, the 
types of instruments covered by contracts expanded to include CDO which were often backed by pools of 
mortgages.  In addition, the secondary market expanded as investors bought and sold CDS multiple times – making 
bets on the underlying firms’ credit worthiness. 
 
To illustrate how the market works, consider the following CDS.  Western Asset Core Plus Bond Fund (a 
mutual fund with $14.6 billion under management) sold a contract to Credit Suisse First Boston to insure $9 million 
of Eastman Kodak bonds.  If Kodak declares bankruptcy, Western Asset has to pay Credit Suisse some or all of the 
$9 million in losses.  For providing this protection, Western Asset receives 1.4 percent per quarter on the $9 million 
from Credit Suisse.
1
  However, and this is where it begins to get “sticky,” a CDS differs from traditional insurance 
T 
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in that financial institutions or other investor can insure bonds even if they don’t own them.   Neither Western Asset 
nor Credit Suisse owns the Eastman Kodak bonds.  This means that technically any financial player can place a bet 
on Kodak's credit quality.  This kind of speculation has pushed the value of outstanding CDS to $58 trillion, much 
larger than the $6.2 trillion in outstanding U.S. corporate debt.
2
    
 
This illustration highlights the “good” side of a CDS – it provides protection against non-payment to one 
party and a return for providing this protection to the other party.  However, it also illustrates a possible cause of the 
“bad” side of a CDS – neither party has to be directly involved in the underlying loan. 
 
THE BAD 
 
Credit Default Swaps are a good idea that, in some ways, went bad.  Following are some of the risks 
created by the instruments and some of the questionable practices used by market participants. 
 
Predatory Method: Credit default swaps changed the relationship between lenders and borrowers by sometimes 
pitting them against each other.
3
  Theoretically, creditors should attempt to keep solvent firms out of bankruptcy.  
However, with a CDS, some investors take a more predatory approach.  Lenders (often hedge funds) who own a 
large number of CDS contracts may find bankruptcy more financially attractive than the solvency of the borrower.  
The exposure they hedged may provide them with higher returns from CDS payouts than from out-of- court 
restructuring plans.  For example when SIX FLAGS, the theme-park operator, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection in June, it was the bondholders, rather than the credit market, who restrained its restructuring effort.  
Traditionally, if a firm (borrower) found itself in financial distress, bondholders often agreed to restructuring of the 
debt obligation as the expected return to the bondholder was higher if the firm could return to financial health than 
the return generated by bankruptcy.  But with the protection provided by the CDS, the financial return of the hedged 
bondholders may be greater from forcing bankruptcy than from agreeing to a restructured debt obligation.    
 
Liquidity Black Hole: Banks hold more than a trillion dollars worth of CDS and many consider them a ticking time 
bomb.  As the economy turned from boom to bust, credit markets froze and corporate bankruptcies began to 
increase, and the housing market collapsed and foreclosures began to escalate.  Credit insurers are vulnerable to 
shocks caused by a glut of defaults.  The corporate default rate is expected by some to peak at 12.8 percent by the 
end of the year, up from 2.4 percent last year.
4
  Mortgage defaults and foreclosures are reaching record numbers.  
Defaults trigger CDS payments and this could cause a chain reaction which would be felt throughout the market.  
These claims are “notional” until insurers have to cover their positions.  There is a danger that sellers of the 
protection may not have the funds to make good on these ever increasing losses.  The buyers of CDS may face the 
loss generated by the default of the borrower plus the loss generated by the default of the seller of the “insurance” 
contract – the CDS. 
 
Liability Coverage:  Volatile bond prices may force swap holders to put up more collateral to cover their current 
liability.  An example of this can be seen with the meltdown of Lehman Brothers.  As fear spread in the market that 
Lehman would not be able to meet its debt obligations, the cost of its debt protection – CDS – began to rise rapidly.  
Lehman struggled to raise new capital to cover its CDS holdings, but was unable to and was forced to declare 
bankruptcy instead.  
 
Counterparty Risks:  There is the danger of counterparty risks where the company on the other side of the contract 
won't or can’t pay up.  Banks and insurance companies are regulated, but the Credit Default Swap market is not.   
Contracts can be traded and traded again, in the well developed secondary market, without anyone ensuring that the 
buyer has the resources to cover the losses in case of default.  In other words, although a CDS is set up to look like 
insurance, it is something completely different.  Insurance companies are required to set aside sufficient reserves of 
capital to cover losses on their obligations.  This is not the case with the CDS.  There is no requirement that money 
be set aside to ensure payment of financial obligations.  It is a promise to transact only and no one regulates or 
monitors the amount of additional financial liability of any of the market participants or whether they have the 
financial reserves to make good on their promises. 
 
 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – April, 2010 Volume 8, Number 4 
31 
Higher Cost of Capital: Traditionally, corporate credit lines are tied to short term interest rates.  However, several 
big banks such as Bank of America, Citibank, and JP Morgan Chase are linking credit lines to both short-term rates 
and Credit Default Swaps.
5
  Under the CDS based credit line, when the price of a CDS rises (the market thinks the 
company’s financial health is deteriorating), the interest rate rises.  In other words, the higher the risk the banks 
assume on these loans, the higher the cost of loan.  Sounds logical as these new products give the lenders an extra 
layer of protection, but the borrowing company now has to deal with both the short-term interest rates and the CDS.   
At a time when banks are tightening credit and charging higher fees, companies do not have many options but to 
take the CDS linked loans.  Instead, they are forced to accept potentially a higher cost of funds in this uncertain 
economic period.  There is a danger that credit, which is the lifeblood of the economy, will continue to shrivel as 
there will be less credit flowing into the system.            
 
THE UGLY 
 
Credit default swaps became popular in the late 1990s as a way to make it easier for Wall Street to bundle 
and package an ever more complex array of debt securities.  The banks hired the ratings agencies to obtain AAA 
ratings for these complex debt securities that could then be sold to mutual funds, pension funds, insurance 
companies and other investors in the U.S. and around the world.  The growth of the CDS market closely coincided 
with efforts to stimulate the economy following the downturn that began in early 2001.  To revive the economy, the 
U.S. Federal Reserve under Chairman Alan Greenspan, dramatically lowered interest rates to around 1 percent and 
kept the rates low for a very long time.  This fueled a housing boom and bubble in which home prices skyrocketed.  
The rapid increase in home prices encouraged homeowners to refinance and withdraw equity to support their 
spending habits, and speculators to borrow and flip properties to generate returns.   Securitization or selling a CDO 
backed by pools of home mortgages (which has been the typical practice for decades) and Credit Default Swaps 
which provided “insurance” against losses on the CDO generated enormous fees for the investment banks, banks, 
mortgage companies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  And, the CDS market ballooned.
6
    
 
The CDS was created to reduce the risk of financial loss caused by default on a loan obligation – a typical 
corporate bond or a complicated financial instrument like a collateralized debt obligation.  However because of the 
risks and practices listed above, the CDS could increase the risk of loss associated with default substantially.  But 
perhaps an even greater risk is what occurred during the housing bubble – a failure by some institutions to follow 
normal underwriting standards for the issuance of debt.  When the bubble burst and the housing market crashed, 
sub-prime mortgages and exotic mortgage instruments (interest only and low teaser rate mortgages for example) 
began to default.  These exotic mortgage instruments had allowed borrower to get into the housing market who 
would have been excluded by traditional qualification standards.  An old truth was recognized – it doesn’t matter 
how pretty the package is if the gift inside is broken.  That is, no matter how complex the CDO is or how high its 
credit rating, if the pooled loans are of low quality, default is likely.  The wave of defaults hit the sellers of CDS 
such as banks and insurance companies, and the purchasers of CDO and CDS such as hedge funds, pension funds, 
and the giant mortgage agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac like a tsunami.   It appears that the CDS often did not 
protect against the risk of loss from default, but instead enabled some market participants to gamble with other 
people’s money.7  Because the CDS market was unregulated, it became an unknown force in the credit markets 
creating unknown instability and risk.  Few understood how interconnected financial institutions had become 
because CDS contracts were sold and resold with no assurance the parties that accepted the premiums for the 
various CDS actually had the resources to pay on these contracts.  As a result, “… the credit markets froze when 
[Lehman Brothers], once the fourth-largest U.S. investment bank, collapsed in the world’s biggest 
bankruptcy”…and its CDS contracts could no longer be honored.8   
 
The deficiencies in the CDS market played out with devastating consequences in the near bankruptcy of the 
one of the largest insurance companies in the world, American International Group (AIG).  As of today, the AIG 
debacle has cost the American taxpayers more than $182 billion and Credit Default Swaps played a large part in the 
federal government’s decision to bail out AIG in September 2008.    The “… Federal Reserve [had] concluded that if 
AIG failed and defaulted on its swaps, [it would have thrown] the liability for the insured securities onto the swaps’ 
counterparties, [and] the result could [have been] a daisy chain of failures across the international financial system.”9     
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How had this happened?  AIG, as an insurance company, was responsible for investing its customers’ 
premiums in liquid assets so that those assets would be available to pay future claims.  Historically, a company like 
AIG would invest in safe investments like Treasuries.  However, during the years of the booming economy when 
defaults on debt were rare and returns on safe securities were very low, banks, hedge funds and insurance companies 
like AIG began to see selling CDS contracts as a better way to obtain higher returns with minimal risk.  Instead of 
buying and selling bonds with their customers’ money, companies found it easier, quicker and more lucrative to 
simply buy and sell CDS contracts.  Because of CDS, bond trading was transformed “into a highly leveraged, high 
velocity business.”10  
 
When Lehman Brothers failed in 2008 triggering a global credit meltdown and real estate prices declined 
dramatically reducing the value of mortgage-back securities, AIGs credit rating was downgraded.  With the loss of 
its AAA credit rating, AIGs CDS counterparties demanded dramatic increases in the collateral AIG was required to 
pay to its CDS counterparties.  When AIG was unable to provide the $100 billion in collateral required under the 
estimated $450 billion in CDS contracts it had written, the federal government stepped in and loaned it $85 billion in 
American taxpayers’ money.  The government felt this was necessary to prevent a global financial meltdown in 
credit resulting from cascading failures in CDS payments from one financial institution to another.   
 
In the fourth quarter of 2008, AIG lost more than $60 billion, the largest quarterly loss in the history of 
American business.  As of today, the federal government has bailed out AIG three more times.  George Soros, the 
billionaire investor, suggested that CDS contracts should be outlawed because they are “truly toxic.  It’s like buying 
life insurance on someone else’s life, and owning a license to kill.”11  
 
FINANCIAL REFORM 
 
The Securities and Exchange Commission estimates that credit default swaps made up about $60 trillion of 
the $600 trillion credit derivatives market.  The Bank of International Settlements,  often referred to as the central 
bankers’ central bank,  puts the size of the global credit derivatives market much higher at about $1.2 quadrillion.  
No one knows for sure how large a market this is because currently credit derivatives are unregulated and are not 
traded on an exchange.  Because these numbers are so huge, it is no wonder that in 2002 Warren Buffet has referred 
to credit derivatives as “financial weapons of mass destruction.”  As early as 1997, some regulators began to worry 
about the size of the market and the lack of regulation.  In testimony before Congress, the head of the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), Brooksley Born, warned about the rising threat of these derivatives.  She was 
promptly silenced by Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin and Assistant 
Deputy Secretary Larry Summers.
12
 Instead of heeding the warning, Senator Phil Gramm spearheaded the passage 
of the 2000 Commodity Futures Modernization Act, which prevented the CFTC from regulating over-the-counter 
derivatives such as credit-default swaps.
13
  Some market observers believe this bill is a major cause of the near 
collapse of the financial markets. 
  
The Bush and Obama Administrations reacted to the financial crisis by pouring billions of dollars into 
banks, insurance companies, automobile manufactures etc.  As the economy began to stabilize, the federal 
government turned from crisis mode to speculation as to the causes and development of plans to prevent this from 
happening again.   
 
The Obama Administration announced its plan to overhaul the financial system in June 2009.  The 
administration believes a major cause of the meltdown was “an absence of oversight.”  Therefore, a new agency 
would be created to regulate consumer financial products, police institutional investors and rein in the mortgage 
industry, and more power would be given to the Federal Reserve (Fed), the Treasury Department, and the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Company (FDIC).  The Fed would become the top watchdog of the financial system and would 
regulate banks, brokerages, investors, and insurers deemed to big to fail.  The Treasury Secretary would work with 
the Fed and chair a Council with the power to veto a decision by the Fed to make emergency loans to financial 
institutions.  The FDIC would be given the power to seize and unwind not only banks, but any financial institution. 
 
This was followed in August by a proposal for reforming the derivatives market.  Under the Obama 
proposal “standardized” derivatives would be required to go through clearinghouses and be traded through an 
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exchange or electronic trading system.  Standardized derivatives would be subject to regulation by both the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.  They would also be 
subject to record-keeping requirements and trades and prices would have to be reported promptly.  However, under 
this proposal customized derivative products would continue to remain unregulated.  Gary Gensler, chairman of the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, warned Congress that the Obama proposal was too weak and would 
undermine the efforts of the regulators to combat fraud.  Although Gensler helped draft the Obama Administration’s 
proposals, he said that the final proposal contains too many exemptions which could be used by traders to avoid 
regulation.
14
 
 
Several ideas and plan began making their way through Congress.  House Financial Services Committee 
Chairman Barney Franks suggested banning “naked” CDS transactions, although market makers probably would be 
excluded from the ban.  It is believed that about 80 percent of CDS contracts are held by speculators who do not 
own the underlying security.  Representative Maxine Waters suggested a ban of all CDS contracts.  In her view, this 
is the only effective way to curb the abuses that have become rampant in the CDS market.  Representative Waters 
stated that unless CDS are completely banned, the same excesses could occur through the use of the exceptions for 
customized credit derivatives.  Others have suggested setting higher capital and margin requirements.  The 
Derivatives Trading Accountability and Disclosure Act, introduced by a group of democratic congressmen, would 
create an Office of Derivatives Supervision (ODS)within the Treasury Department with the power to set rules for 
derivatives trading and, similar to Obama plan, it would give Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) the ability to propose rules on margins and clearinghouses, but 
would give the ODS the right to override proposals and censure/suspend traders. 
 
But “solutions” are not limited to Congress or the President.  The International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (a trade group) is working on a proposal to refine how CDS are documented and settled.  Many are 
proposing a “Clearinghouse” similar to those in futures and options markets.  The Fed took the first step in creating 
a clearinghouse by making the Intercontinental Exchange part of the Federal Reserve System to enable it to act as a 
central counterparty.  However, Intercontinental is not the only institution anxious to create a clearinghouse.  Both 
Chicago’s CME group, and NYSE Euronext have shown interest in setting up a clearinghouse for the CDS as well. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Problems in the Credit Default Swap market could have a greater impact on the economy than the sub-
prime meltdown.  If bond insurance disappears or becomes more expensive, lenders may become more risk averse 
and lending standards tighten further.  This could impact all borrowers from individuals applying for mortgages to 
municipalities borrowing to build schools.   
 
Those who think the impact will be limited point to the global flow of funds and the improving economies 
in Asia, France and Germany.  They point out that the CDS market survived – and some say “flourished” – during 
the last 12 months of global financial crisis. 
 
However, the question remains if the federal government had not pumped billions of dollars into AIG and it 
had failed bringing down some of its counterparties including Goldman Sachs and some large European banks, 
where would the economy be today? And even more interesting, are there other AIGs out there waiting to be 
discovered? 
 
In the end, Credit Default Swaps are probably not the cause of our current financial problems.  Greed and 
irresponsible use of these – and other derivative instruments – caused the problems.  Some of the criticisms on the 
CDS may be misguided.  But nonetheless, the process of credit risk transfer needs some correction to prevent the 
unpredictable and painful consequences as experienced last Fall.  New regulation will probably be passed – as early 
as the Fall, but what it will look like is still unclear.  The only idea that seems to have fairly universal support is the 
idea of a clearinghouse.  The question is will it be controlled by the government or run by private organizations. 
 
We seem to be through the first chapter of the book, but it is too early to predict the ending.  So, stay tuned! 
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